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FROM NO PROTECTION TO HIGH PROTECTION: THE SUPREME 
COURT ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH (1942–1976)  
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes one of the major rights 
for people in a democratic society: freedom of speech. Throughout American 
constitutional history, the Supreme Court has provided for a wide interpretation of this 
Amendment, identifying many different categories of speech, such as: freedom of the 
press, political speech, artistic speech, defamation, obscenity, and commercial speech. 
Not all of these categories have been treated equally by the Court, proving various 
standards of protection for various kinds of speech. Many categories of speech now 
protected were earlier interpreted as unconstitutional, which meant exclusion from 
coverage by the First Amendment. Commercial speech is the best example of such a 
process, therefore it is quite interesting to look at how and why the Supreme Court 
decided to change the constitutional status of speech which is connected with 
advertising. 
Commercial speech may be understood as speech of any form that advertises a 
product or service for profit or for a business purpose. In other words, commercial 
speech proposes commercial transaction.1 Commercial speech mainly serves to carry 
information for society concerning the availability and character of particular services 
and products. In this dimension, members of the society, who are recipients of this kind 
of speech, become customers, because the main purpose of advertising is to sell goods. 
Commercial speech is directly connected with consumption and purchasing, which 
tend to be an indispensable part of the free market. If advertising is so vital for the 
everyday life of a contemporary society, it has to play a major role in such a country as 
the United States. However, looking back at the history of protection of commercial 
speech,2 we can observe that justices used to treat it for a long time less seriously than 
other forms of speech, especially between the years 1942–1976. There was even a time 
when advertising was not considered to be speech at all.3 An analysis of the 
development of the status of commercial speech should begin in the early 1940s, when 
the Supreme Court, for the first time, considered the problem of advertising in the 
scope of the First Amendment. 
In 1942, the Court reviewed the case Valentine v. Chrestensen,4 in which it had to 
decide upon the constitutionality of a New York law prohibiting distribution of 
advertising in public. The case concerned a person who attempted to distribute a flyer 
advertising his submarine tour attraction. On one side of the flyer there was an 
advertisement for the tour, and on the other a protest against certain New York 
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policies. The police department reviewed the flyer and stated that it violated a statute 
prohibiting distribution of advertising flyers. Chrestensen was advised he could 
distribute only the side of the flyer containing the protest. He sued the city to enjoin it 
from restraining distribution of the two-sided flyer. The state court convicted him of 
violating the law, but he appealed and the case was finally brought before the highest 
court in the American judicial system. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and 
presented a verdict on the issue of whether the application of the law to Chrestensen’s 
activity was an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom of speech. 
Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, determining that the First 
Amendment did not apply to restrictions on ‘purely commercial advertising.’ The New 
York law was upheld, because distribution of the flyer was considered to be more 
‘commercial activity,’ than a kind of speech: 
(...) This Court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the 
freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinions and that, though the states 
and municipalities may appropriately regulate that privilege in the public interest, they may not 
unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally sure 
that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial 
advertising. Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the 
streets, to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are 
matters for legislative judgment. (...) 
The Court, without citing a precedent, historical evidence, or policy considerations, 
effectively read commercial speech out of the First Amendment.5 Advertising was 
thought to be only an economic issue, that should be subject to governmental 
regulations. But the absence of any explanation for refusing protection of this kind of 
speech, and defining it as nothing more than commercial activity, meant that the 
justices did not even try to treat advertising as an important way of expressing 
someone’s views and opinions. The Chrestensen decision was followed only a few 
weeks later by the Court’s decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,6 sustaining a 
conviction for ‘fighting words,’ and excluding from the First Amendment certain “well 
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which had never been thought to raise any constitutional problem.” Among the 
mentioned classes were: “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the 
insulting or fighting words.” The absence of advertising from this list of disfavored 
types of expression seems surprising in view of the close proximity of the two 
decisions. The anomaly was compounded by the complete absence in the Chrestensen 
verdict of even so rudimentary an explanation for refusing protection as the justices 
offered a few weeks later, in the specific context of fighting words, for relegating a 
category of speech to the realm of “least-favored expression.”7 As we can observe, at 
the beginning of the discussion concerning commercial speech, the American judiciary 
offered it no constitutional protection. 
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The same line of reasoning as in Chrestensen was presented by justices nine years 
later in the Breard v. Alexandria8 case, when the Court upheld a municipal ordinance 
which prohibited canvassers from calling upon the occupants of private residences 
without having first been invited to do so. A Louisiana salesman, Jack H. Breard, went 
from house to house selling magazines without prior permission, which was a violation 
of the state law. While delivering the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, Justice 
Reed noted, that selling was a purely commercial activity, but at the same time there 
was no reason to protect it with the First Amendment: 
(...) Finally we come to a point not heretofore urged in this Court as a ground for the invalidation 
of the Green River ordinance. This is that such an ordinance is an abridgment of freedom of 
speech and the press. Only the press or oral advocates of ideas could urge this point. It was not 
open to the solicitors of gadgets or brushes. (...) Thus the argument is not that the moneymaking 
activities of the solicitor entitle him to go “in or upon private residences” at will, but that the 
distribution of periodicals through door-to-door canvassing is entitled to First Amendment 
protection. This kind of distribution is said to be protected because the mere fact that money is 
made out of the distribution does not bar the publications from First Amendment protection. We 
agree that the fact that periodicals are sold does not put them beyond the protection of the First 
Amendment. The selling, however, brings into the transaction a commercial feature. (...)  
Once again the highest tribunal in the American judiciary system disregarded 
advertising as any kind of speech, that could be constitutionally protected. 
It is important to mention, however, that there was one justice in the Supreme Court 
who decided to express his deep concern about the Chrestensen verdict. Despite being 
in the majority9 in 1942, Justice Douglas did not hesitate to criticize the reasoning of 
the Court, by delivering a concurring opinion 16 years later in the Cammarano v. 
United States case:10 
Valentine v. Chrestensen held that business advertisements and commercial matters did not enjoy 
the protection of the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. The 
ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived reflection. That “freedom of speech or 
of the press,” directly guaranteed against encroachment by the Federal Government and 
safeguarded against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is not 
in terms or by implication confined to discourse of a particular kind or nature. It has often been 
stressed as essential to the exposition and exchange of political ideas, to the expression of 
philosophical attitudes, to the flowering of the letters. Important as the First Amendment is to all 
those cultural ends, it has not been restricted to them. Individual or group protests against action 
which results in monetary injuries are certainly not beyond the reach of the First Amendment (...) 
A protest against government action that affects a business occupies as high a place. The profit 
motive should make no difference, for that is an element inherent in the very conception of a 
press under our system of free enterprise. Those who make their living through exercise of First 
Amendment rights are no less entitled to its protection than those whose advocacy or promotion is 
not hitched to a profit motive. (...) 
While analysing the issue of commercial speech it is impossible not to mention the 
case in which the Supreme Court decided upon the constitutionality of political 
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advertisements. It was a famous freedom-of-speech case, New York Times v. Sullivan,11 
mainly focusing on another category of speech, a libel. It concerned a full-page 
advertisement in the newspaper which alleged that the arrest of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy his efforts to integrate public 
facilities and encourage blacks to vote. L.B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city 
commissioner, filed a libel action against the newspaper, claiming that the allegations 
against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. The Supreme Court, holding 
that the First Amendment protected the publication of all statements about the conduct 
of public officials, did not reckon purely commercial advertising to this category: 
(...) The publication here was not a “commercial” advertisement in the sense in which the word 
was used in the Chrestensen case. It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited 
grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement 
whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern. (...) 
The Court disavowed any role for economic motivation in its analysis, noting “that the 
newspaper was paid for publishing the advertisement” and that this was “as immaterial 
in this connection as the fact that the newspapers and books were sold.” The New York 
Times case did not go far beyond the understanding of commercial speech as set out in 
Chrestensen. While the advertisement at issue solicited funds as openly as an 
advertisement for an ordinary product, the money served political ends, rather than 
merely financial ones.12 
The first significant change to the Court’s understanding of commercial speech took 
place in 1975 when the Bigelow v. Virginia13 case was decided. Bigelow, director and 
managing editor of the Virginia Weekly, was convicted under Virginia law because his 
newspaper had printed an advertisement for an organization which referred women to 
clinics and hospitals for abortions. After his appeal, the case was brought to the 
Supreme Court, in order to investigate the validity of Virginia’s law. In the name of the 
Court, Justice Blackmun stated that it was a mistake to assume that advertising, as 
such, was entitled to no First Amendment Protection:  
(...) the holding of Chrestensen is distinctly a limited one: the ordinance was upheld as a 
reasonable regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed. The 
fact that it had the effect of banning a particular handbill does not mean that Chrestensen is the 
authority for the proposition that all statutes regulating commercial advertising are immune from 
constitutional challenge. (...) Advertising, like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable 
regulation that serves a legitimate public interest. To the extent that commercial activity is subject 
to regulation, the relationship of speech to that activity may be one factor, among others, to be 
considered in weighing the First Amendment interest against the governmental interest alleged. 
Advertising is not thereby stripped of all First Amendment protection. The relationship of speech 
to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of 
ideas. (...)Regardless of the particular label asserted by the State – whether it calls speech 
“commercial” or “commercial advertising” or “solicitation” – a court may not escape the task of 
assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest 
allegedly served by the regulation. (...) 
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The decision confirmed the applicability of the First Amendment to the right of 
consumers to gain access to truthful information about a service that was lawful where 
it was to be performed.14 In other words, information expressed in advertisements were 
seen to have a precious role in society, which acted upon rights and freedoms 
expressed in the Constitution. In this case, the Court for the first time treated a for-
profit advertisement as genuine speech, entitled to the First Amendment consideration 
on its own merits, rather than disposing of it by referring to Chrestensen.15 The stage 
was set for another decision that would offer more protection for commercial speech, 
and the Court did not let people wait for long. 
On the 24th of May, 1976, Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion in the Virginia 
Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council16 case, concerning advertising prices 
of prescription drugs. Acting on behalf of prescription drug consumers, the Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council challenged a Virginia statute that declared it 
unprofessional conduct for licensed pharmacists to advertise their prescription drug 
prices. On appeal from an adverse ruling by a three-judge District Court panel, the 
Supreme Court granted the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy a review. The issue 
before the Court was whether a statutory ban on advertising prescription drug prices by 
licensed pharmacists is a violation of commercial speech under the First Amendment. 
It was clearly a case in which commercial speech would gain more interest from the 
justices, but was it tantamount to gaining constitutional protection? The first part of the 
majority opinion revealed a new approach to this topic: 
(...) The appellants contend that the advertisement of prescription drug prices is outside the 
protection of the First Amendment because it is “commercial speech.” There can be no question 
that in past decisions the Court has given some indication that commercial speech is unprotected. 
In Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court upheld a New York statute that prohibited the distribution 
of any “handbill, circular or other advertising matter whatsoever in or upon any street.” The Court 
concluded that, although the First Amendment would forbid the banning of all communication by 
handbill in the public thoroughfares, it imposed “no such restraint on government as respect to 
purely commercial advertising.” Further support for a “commercial speech” exception to the First 
Amendment may perhaps be found in Breard v. Alexandria, where the Court upheld a conviction 
for violation of an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions. (...) 
Moreover, the Court several times has stressed that communications to which First Amendment 
protection was given were not “purely commercial.” (...) Since the decision in Breard, however, 
the Court has never denied protection on the ground that the speech in issue was “commercial 
speech.” (...) Last Term in Bigelow v. Virginia, the notion of unprotected “commercial speech” all 
but passed from the scene. (...) Some fragment of hope for the continuing validity of a 
“commercial speech” exception arguably might have persisted because of the subject matter of 
the advertisement in Bigelow. We noted that in announcing the availability of legal abortions in 
New York, the advertisement “did more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It 
contained factual material of clear public interest.” (...) Here, in contrast, the question whether 
there is a First Amendment exception for “commercial speech” is squarely before us. (...) 
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By referring to the history of commercial speech in the Court’s rulings, the justices 
presented a progressive change in their legal reasoning. Having an opportunity to 
finally determine the constitutional status of commercial speech, the Court stated:  
(...) Focusing first on the individual parties to the transaction that is proposed in the commercial 
advertisement, we may assume that the advertiser’s interest is a purely economic one. That hardly 
disqualifies him from protection under the First Amendment. The interests of the Contestants in a 
labor dispute are primarily economic, but it has long been settled that both the employee and the 
employer are protected by the First Amendment when they express themselves on the merits of 
the dispute in order to influence its outcome. (...)As to the particular consumer’s interest in the 
free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his 
interest in the day’s most urgent political debate. (...) Generalizing, society also may have a strong 
interest in the free flow of commercial information. Even an individual advertisement, though 
entirely “commercial,” may be of general public interest. (...) Advertising, however tasteless and 
excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is 
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a 
predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be 
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those 
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of 
commercial information is indispensable. And if it is indispensable to the proper allocation of 
resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent 
opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First 
Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision-making in a 
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal. (...) 
The holding of the precedent determined that commercial speech was not wholly 
outside the protection of the First Amendment, and therefore the Virginia statute was 
invalid. But this verdict meant something more than just for the defendants; it was an 
example of adapting the law to modern social and economic reality. The Court 
acknowleged that if the advertiser’s interest in a commercial advertisement is purely 
economic, it does not disqualify him from constitutional protection. This way, both the 
individual and society may have vital interests in the free flow of commercial 
information. 
The Supreme Court held in the Virginia Pharmacy case that speech is reduced to a 
less-favoured status only when it does no more “than propose a commercial 
transaction.” The Court has thus far relied on “common sense” to differentiate between 
commercial and noncommercial speech. The two common sense distinctions are: that 
commercial speech is more verifiable than other types of speech; and that commercial 
speech is more durable than other types of speech.17 At the same time the Court 
decided not to protect every kind of commercial speech, especially false advertising, 
which has no value and deserves no constitutional protection: 
(...) In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we have not held 
that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are common sense differences between 
speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction,” and other varieties. Even if 
the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject 
to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of 
protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is 
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unimpaired. The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by its 
disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the 
advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself 
provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may be 
more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there 
is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely. (...)” 
The 1976 opinion concluded that the same interest that supports regulation of 
potentially misleading advertising – namely, the public interest in receiving accurate 
commercial information – also supports an interpretation of the First Amendment that 
provides constitutional protection for the dissemination of accurate and nonmisleading 
commercial messages.18 
Commercial speech had been treated mostly as commerce and rarely as speech prior 
to the Virginia Pharmacy case.19 After the case, the state could reach the same policy 
goals as it chose to reach before, but it could not use the means of prohibiting the 
dissemination of truthful information about lawful activity. The purpose of this holding 
was not merely to standardize the interpretation of the First Amendment, but also it 
wass to encourage more rational majority decision-making and a more open weighing 
of the advantages and disadvantages of policy alternatives by preventing the use of the 
commercial speech concept to entirely deny First Amendment protection to an 
important area of speech.20 The Court both employed conventional First Amendment 
analysis in founding its rationale and, in turn, expanded the horizon of free speech. The 
case is also useful to illustrate the general accommodation of speech values to be made 
in concrete contexts, such as the commercial area.21  
 
* 
 
Despite differing opinions about the character of commercial speech,22 one thing is 
unquestionable: advertising is now more highly protected by the Constitution. 
However, we can not say that there are no limits to this protection. The approach to this 
category of speech is quite different than it used to be before the 1970s; nevertheless, it 
is not given full protection. Of course the Court has the opportunity to decide a 
commercial speech case in light of the First Amendment, but at the same time justices 
may find some circumstances that would remove it from protection. Instead of treating 
commercial speech as presumptively protected by the Constitution, the Court tends to 
proceed on the theory that any protection of such speech must be justified. In other 
words, the justification of the protection is based not on the expressive liberty of the 
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and First Amendment Theory, “Northwestern University Law Review,” vol. 74, 1979, pp. 385–386. 
speaker, but on the importance of the information to the audience.23 From no protection 
to high protection – this is how the history of commercial speech looks throughout the 
years 1940–1976. Although it has been almost 30 years since the Virginia Pharmacy 
verdict, the holding of this case is still binding. 
Advertising can provide useful information – this is what we are all sure of, and it is 
the real rationale for the case from 1976. While formulating main principles and 
provisions of the Constitution, as well as the Bill of Rights, the Framers could not 
imagine that the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech would force the 
Supreme Court to divide speech into various categories, some of which would suffer 
from no constitutional protection. Luckily for people involved in commerce, but also 
for all other ‘listeners’ (consumers), advertising fell into the category of speech that is 
protected by nine justices. Any other solution would have become impossible to adapt 
to contemporary American society and economy. 
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